Political Parties in Turkey: From 2010 Referendum to 2011 June Elections (SETA Policy Briefs Book 52)

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According to the robust regressions estimated, the relationship between turnout and education is inverse U-shaped, and between turnout and age including generational effects , it is U-shaped. Immigration, emigration, large population, a large number of parliament members elected from a constituency, participation by large number of parties, and existence of a dominant party depress the turnout rate.

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However, at destinations where large numbers of immigrants from different regions are concentrated, the opportunity afforded to them to elect one of their own reduces the adverse impact of immigration significantly and in some cases even turns it to positive. The latter finding may explain why voter turnout declines in Europe and North America but not in Turkey. During the last sixty years, about 7 to 8 percent of the Turkish population has moved from one province to another in every five-year interval.

As can be observed from Figures 1 and 2 , this movement was essentially from the east and north towards the west and south, that is, from the less developed and poorer parts of the country to the more industrialized and richer regions. As a consequence of this massive internal migration, the urbanization rate has increased from about 25 percent in to 42 percent in , 65 percent in , and 77 percent in Now 39 percent of Turkish population resides in a province other than the one in which they were born.

This figure was 28 percent in , 17 percent in , and only 12 percent in 1. On the other hand, more than half of the people born in thirty-four of the eighty-one provinces were living elsewhere. Immigrant: proportion of provincial population born in another province Emigrant: proportion of population born in the province that is residing in another province The main purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of such large population movements on political participation in Turkey. We examine the impact on the voter turnout not only at the destinations of migrants but also at locations they have left.

The former is studied extensively in the literature, but political consequences of migration for sending communities are highly neglected. The small number of studies that exist limited their analysis to a few specific cases and to the effects of remittances and brain drain in the context of international migration, not internal. This is one of the gaps in the migration and turnout literatures we hope to fill.

To measure the effects of immigration and emigration on turnout properly, naturally we will have to control for and estimate the impacts of other socio-economic, demographic, political and institutional factors as well. Producing this information is another purpose of this study. These studies consider socio-economic factors, but none of them take emigration into account.

While the first two include immigration in their regressions, they ignore political and institutional factors. The last one, on the other hand, includes political and institutional variables, but none on immigration. By including all types of variables mentioned in our turnout equation, we hope to measure their individual effects more accurately. Our study should be of interest not only for those specializing in Turkey but for those studying the impact of immigration and emigration in other countries as well.

Our results may be of value in particular to those investigating determinants of political participation in West Europe and North America. Most of the countries in the latter two regions are experiencing steady declines in voter turnout, which have reached alarming levels 2. No such tendency exists in Turkey, where the turnout rate is about twice as high as in many industrialized nations. Capturing some of the factors which make the Turkish rate so high and non-declining can shed light on the situation in Western countries.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, determinants of voter turnout are discussed, and a model is specified for the Turkish parliamentary election. In section 3, empirical results are presented, interpreted, and compared to those obtained by other studies. Finally in section 4, the conclusions reached are summarized. S tudies on turnout define their dependent variable as the ratio of the number of voters to one of the following: the entire population, the voting-age population, the eligible population, or the number of registered voters.

Although the first two are considered often due to the ease with which they can be obtained, obviously the latter two are more proper and will be our choice. These are identical in our case due to the switch in Turkey in to a system of automatic registration of all citizens eligible to vote without any effort on their part 3. He notes that among these variables, those on population size, population mobility and political competition appear to be most important, and those on population concentration and homogeneity are not important at all.


The findings on variables relating to political fragmentation on the other hand are ambiguous. Although some studies also consider the age and education structures of the population, Geys disregards them on the grounds that interpretations of their parameters carry a potential danger for ecological fallacy. However, Smets and Van Ham , who surveyed 90 individual-level studies, note that education and age are the two most common independent variables in such studies, and the two that are found to be most successful.

We believe that as long as one is cautious about deducing individual level relationships from patterns observed in aggregate-level data, controlling for age and education would be beneficial rather than harmful. For brevity, we will not review all of the papers published since the Geys survey. These studies considered variables similar to the ones used by earlier studies, as we will do here.

However, we will ignore institutional variables relating to election system and type, day of the week and month of the year the election is held, time elapsed since the last election, voting age, whether voting is compulsory or optional, and the ease of registration, as these do not vary in our data. The election is held on the same day and under the same rules in every province.

The first eight of the above variables are included in our model to control for socio-economic, demographic, political and institutional characteristics of provinces so that we can estimate the parameters of the last three variables more accurately. Although the results pertaining to the first group of variables are important in their own right, here our main focus will be on the impact of the last three, dealing with migration.

The motivation for considering PRIMARY is that without some minimum level of education, the act of voting alone could be a difficult task, let alone gathering and evaluating information on candidates, parties and issues facing the country and the province. We presume that for most people, primary school education can be taken as that critical level. The HIGHER variable is added to see if the effect of education on turnout dampens when the province has more people with higher education.

As one ages, one accumulates resources, becomes more experienced, more informed, more settled, and acquires a greater sense of responsibility. On the other hand, the opportunity cost of time increases and health deteriorates as one gets older, which creates disincentives to vote.

Consequently, the age-turnout relation is likely to be curvilinear. For that reason, modelers often include in their turnout equations, in addition to age, age-squared. Individuals born and raised in the same time period are exposed to the same socio-historical events which shape their political socialization. Consequently, political participation may vary between generations too.

Bhatti and Hansen argue that this may be the reason behind the curvilinear relationship observed between age and turnout. For instance, the old may turnout in larger numbers than young individuals not due to age per se, but simply because they belong to a generation with higher turnout levels. It is not possible to separate the age and generation effects from each other in aggregate-level studies examining a single election, such as ours.

Individual-level studies find that participation in elections is much higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Voting in urban areas is more cumbersome and the stigma associated with not voting is less as it will be hardly noticed in the anonymity of the city.

Impact of internal migration on political participation in Turkey

Villages on the other hand are closely knit societies where each person has intimate knowledge about the activities of others. However, in Turkey, the urbanization rate is not defined as the proportion of the provincial population living in cities over a certain size but as the proportion residing in provincial and district capitals.

As many district capitals are really small towns, only slightly larger than large villages, this definition does not fully reflect the urbanization level of a province. As highly urbanized provinces have large number of parliament members, the MP variable probably captures the urbanization level better. With the MP variable in the equation, the coefficient of URBAN can be interpreted as how the turnout differs between truly urban areas and typical district and provincial capitals.

There are other reasons for utilizing MP. It reflects also the population size of the constituency, the complexity of the ballot, and the cost involved in gathering information about the candidates. A larger effective number of parties PARTIES raise the probability that voters can find a party with which they identify, encouraging participation.

On the other hand, it also makes it harder for the voters to make up their minds. Also, in a proportional election system, if the share of the top party is relatively high, dispersion of the rest of the votes among many other parties may reduce competition by letting the top party capture a disproportionate number of the seats. The last two reasons may discourage the voters to turn out. Thus, the impact of political fragmentation on turnout is ambiguous.

In parliamentary elections, competition is nationwide. When a dominant party sweeps all of the seats in a constituency, that chance is extinguished. The coefficient of the former measures the impact of migration at the origin and the latter at the destination. We expect both variables in question to be inversely related to the turnout. First, people who emigrate are likely to be the ones who are most active politically.

Third, the ones left behind may be just waiting for their turn to migrate and thus lose interest in local affairs. As explained above, migrant producing provinces have low turnout rates. Also, provinces with immigrants from all over the country have less sense of community. AP — Hundreds of residents evacuated because of a natural gas leak in a Massachusetts city affected by gas explosions and fires last year will soon be able to return AP — Little Mac, a year-old Asian elephant that was a fixture at the Santa Barbara Zoo for nearly all her life, was euthanized this week after a sharp decline in health, AP — Officials say that a man shot and wounded himself during a struggle with a police officer at Portland International Airport and is expected to survive.

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Lower the thermostat a few degrees in winter? Go full-time vegetarian? Probably not. President Donald AP: Democrats in Trump country cautious about impeachment.

US probe of vaping illnesses focuses on THC from marijuana. Dallas cop says she wishes neighbor had killed her instead. Golden Dawn and Galazia Stratia were proven to be directly responsible for many of the attacks. Antonios Androutsopoulos aka Periandros , a prominent member of Golden Dawn, was a fugitive from to September 14, after being accused of the June 16, attempted murder of three left-wing students — including Dimitris Kousouris, who was badly injured.

The authorities' failure to apprehend Androutsopoulos for seven years raised criticisms by the Greek media.


A Ta Nea article claimed that Periandros remained in Greece and evaded arrest due to connections with the police. Some allege that Androutsopoulos had evaded arrest because he had been residing in Venezuela until he turned himself in On February 2 , , Golden Dawn planned to hold the annual march for the twelfth anniversary of the Imia military crisis.

Anti-fascist groups organised a protest in order to cancel the march, as a response to racist attacks supposedly caused by Golden Dawn members. Golden Dawn members occupied the square in which the march was to take place, and when anti-fascists showed up, clashes occurred. During the riots that followed, Golden Dawn members were seen attacking the anti-fascists with riot police doing nothing to stop them and actually letting them pass through their lines. This led to two people being wounded by knife and another two wounded by rocks.

There were allegations that Chrysi Avgi members even carried police equipment with them and that Golden Dawn's equipment was carried inside a police van. On March 19 , , a bomb described by the police as of "moderate power," was detonated in the fifth floor office of Golden Dawn, in downtown Athens. Twenty-five minutes prior to the blast, an unidentified caller contacted a local newspaper in order to announce the attack, thus leading to the evacuation of the targeted building and the surrounding area. The explosion caused substantial damage to property, but did not inflict casualties.

The office was reopened on April 10, Members of such organisations were the planners and chief executioners of the riot and nobody was arrested. A Special Forces officer, speaking at a briefing of Special Forces policemen that were to be on duty that day, told the policemen not to arrest anyone because the rioters were not enemies and threatened that should this be overlooked there would be penalties.

November Turkish general election - Wikipedia

Before the surrender of Androutsopoulos, an article by the newspaper Ta Nea claimed that the Golden Dawn had close relationships with some parts of the Greek police force. The article claimed that there was a confidential internal police investigation which concluded that:. The newspaper published a photograph of a typewritten paragraph with no identifiable insignia as evidence of the secret investigation. Chrysochoidis also denied accusations that far right connections within the police force delayed the arrest of Periandros.

He said that leftist groups, including the ultra-left anti-state resistance group 17 November , responsible for several murders, had similarly evaded the police for decades. In both cases, he attributed the failures to "stupidity and incompetence" on behalf of the force. Golden Dawn stated that rumours about the organisation having connections to the Greek police and the government are untrue, and that the police had intervened in Golden Dawn's rallies and had arrested members of the Party several times while the New Democracy party was in power for example, during a rally in Thessaloniki in June , and at a rally for the anniversary of the Greek genocide, in Athens , also in Although riot police units were near the entrance of the building alongside the intruders, they allegedly did not attempt to stop their actions.

The evidence for this is an allegedly fake [72] public document - a payslip - showing the names of both Michaloliakos and far right author and intellectual Konstantinos Plevris as operating for the agency. The party is regularly described as Neo-Nazi by the international news media, [74] and members may be responsible for anti-semitic graffiti.

Officially denying that it has any connection to Neo-Nazism, the party maintains that it cleaves closer to the conservative authoritarianism of Ioannis Metaxas. A portion of content for this article is credited to Wikipedia. He claims, however, that it was merely "the salute of the national youth organisation of [Greek dictator] Ioannis Metaxas", reports the Athens News.